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The Evolution of Repo 
Contracting Conventions
in the 1980s
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
epurchase agreements, or repos, play an important role in
 U.S. securities markets. Securities dealers use repos to 
finance market-making and risk management activities, and 
the agreements provide a safe and low-cost way for mutual 
funds, corporations, and others to lend both money and 
securities. At the end of 2004, primary dealers with a trading 
relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were 
borrowing a total of $3.2 trillion on repos and lending a total of 
$2.4 trillion. Repurchase agreements also play an important 
role in the implementation of monetary policy—the Federal 
Reserve uses them to dampen transient fluctuations in the 
supply of reserves available to the banking system. In 2004, the 
New York Fed’s Trading Desk arranged 192 overnight repos, 
with an average size of $5.9 billion.
A repo is a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to 
repurchase the securities at a specified price on a later date. It is 
analogous to a loan, in which the proceeds of the initial sale 
correspond to the principal amount of the loan and the excess of 
the repurchase price over the sale price corresponds to the interest 
paid on the loan. A market participant might, for example, sell 
securities for $10 million and simultaneously agree to repurchase 
them ten days later for $10,005,555. As Exhibit 1 shows, this is 
comparable to borrowing $10 million for ten days at an interest 
rate of  2 percent per annum. If the borrower fails to repurchase the 
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• The growth of the repo market, new uses 
for repos, and the appearance of previously 
unappreciated risks led to dramatic changes 
in repo contracting conventions in the 1980s. 
￿ The changes included recognition of accrued 
interest on repo securities, a revision to how 
federal bankruptcy law applied to repos, and 
the faster growth of tri-party repo—a new 
form of repurchase agreement.
￿ Individual market participants, motivated 
largely by profit, hastened the growth of
tri-party repo.
￿ Because uncoordinated, individual solutions 
would have been too costly, market 
participants took collective action to bring 
about the recognition of accrued interest 
on repo securities and petition Congress 
to amend federal bankruptcy law.
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securities, the creditor can sell them to a third party and use the 
proceeds to satisfy its claim for repayment. Conversely, if 
the creditor does not return the securities to the borrower, 
the borrower can use the funds that it otherwise would have 
repaid to the creditor to replace the securities.1
Repos have a long history. Federal Reserve Banks used them 
to extend credit to member banks as early as 1917, when a 
wartime tax reduced the attractiveness of rediscounting 
commercial paper.2 During the 1920s, the New York Fed used 
repurchase agreements to extend credit to nonbank dealers in 
bankers’ acceptances to encourage the development of a liquid 
secondary market for acceptances.3 Repos fell into disuse 
during the Great Depression and World War II, but reappeared 
following the restoration of Federal Reserve control of 
monetary policy in 1951.4
Contracting conventions for repurchase agreements hardly 
changed between the revival of repos in the early 1950s and 
1981. However, they began to change dramatically in 1982. 
1See, generally, the Bond Market Association’s 1996 Master Repurchase Agreement 
(<http://www.bondmarkets.com/agrees/master_repo_agreement.pdf>). 
2Beckhart, Smith, and Brown (1932, p. 310), Harris (1933, p. 289), and 
Simmons (1954, p. 25). See also the wartime extension of credit to nonmember 
banks by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York using repurchase agreements 
on Treasury certificates of indebtedness (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
1919, pp. 24-5; Beckhart, Smith, and Brown 1932, pp. 310-1).
3Committee on Banking and Currency (1927a, pp. 431-6, testimony of 
Benjamin Strong, Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Committee 
on Banking and Currency (1927b, pp. 930-5 and 981-91, testimony of W. R. 
Burgess, Assistant Federal Reserve Agent, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), 
Committee on Banking and Currency (1931, pp. 818-24), Beckhart, Smith, and 
Brown (1932, pp. 363-4), Hardy (1932, pp. 249-53), Harris (1933, pp. 289-90), 
and Roosa (1956, p. 25). Additionally, in 1920 the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York used repurchase agreements to encourage the development of a 
liquid secondary market in certificates of indebtedness (Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York 1921, p. 17; Beckhart, Smith, and Brown 1932, pp. 334-5).
The collapse of Drysdale Government Securities, a midsized 
dealer,  in May of that year led to an important change in the 
treatment of accrued interest on repo securities. The collapse of 
a second dealer, Lombard-Wall, three months later prompted 
an equally important change in the application of federal 
bankruptcy law to repos. Additional dealer failures in 1984 
and 1985 accelerated the growth of a new form of repo, 
tri-party repo.
This paper examines how repo contracting conventions 
evolved in the 1980s. In the next section, we consider the 
revival of repo financing in the 1950s and the contracting 
conventions associated with that revival. Section 3 describes 
how the rising level and volatility of interest rates and growing 
Treasury debt fueled a significant expansion in the size of the 
repo market in the 1970s and early 1980s, as well as an 
important change in how market participants used repos. 
Existing contracting conventions proved inadequate for the 
expanding and changing market. Sections 4, 5, and 6 describe 
how new and previously unappreciated risks led participants 
to modify those conventions.
Understanding how repo contracting conventions 
evolved in the 1980s is important for two reasons. First, the 
evolution illustrates how contracting conventions that are 
efficient in one market environment may need to be revised 
when the environment changes. The experience with repur-
chase agreements suggests that revisions may sometimes 
come slowly and only in the wake of “precipitative events” 
that focus attention on inefficient practices.5 Second, the 
evolution demonstrates that institutional arrangements can 
change in a variety of ways. The growth of tri-party repo 
followed from the autonomous adoption of a more efficient 
contract form by individual market participants acting in 
their own economic self-interest. In contrast, the change in 
the treatment of accrued interest was the result of collective 
action by the major government securities dealers and the 
change in bankruptcy law was brought about by market 
participants seeking relief in the form of Congressional 
legislation, because in both cases uncoordinated, individual 
action would have been more costly. 
4Simmons (1954, p. 26). Between mid-1942 and mid-1947, the Federal Reserve 
used repurchase agreements to encourage investors to hold Treasury bills at the 
wartime “posted” rate of 3/8 percent. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Circular no. 2476 (August 8, 1942), Circular no. 3230 (July 3, 1947), and 
Simmons (1947, p. 337; 1952, p. 26; and 1954, pp. 27-8). The Federal Reserve 
reintroduced the use of repurchase agreements for monetary policy purposes 
in June 1949, but used them only intermittently before 1951 (Simmons 1954, 
pp. 23-5 and 32-4).
5The importance of precipitative events in fostering change was also noted in a 
recent study of the origins of the Federal Reserve book-entry system (Garbade 
2004).
Exhibit 1
Borrowing $10 Million at a 2 Percent Interest Rate 
on a Ten-Day Repo
Borrower
Starting leg (day 0)
Creditor
Borrower




$5,555 = (10/360)   2% of $10,000,000
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2.  Repurchase Agreements after the 
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord
Monetary policy after the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 
March 1951 placed renewed emphasis on controlling inflation 
and reduced emphasis on keeping interest rates low. Nonbank 
dealers in Treasury securities, almost all of whom were located 
in New York, began to search for cheaper financing than what 
was available from the large New York banks that had 
historically funded most dealer loans. Rising interest rates also 
gave large state and local governments and nonfinancial 
corporations an incentive to substitute short-term loans for 
interest-free bank demand deposits. Minimal risk, operational 
simplicity, negotiable maturities, and a unique set of 
contracting conventions made repos ideally suited for both 
dealer financing desks and institutional cash managers.6 Two 
particularly important contracting conventions involved 
margin and the allocation of property rights to repo securities.
2.1 Credit Risk and Margin
Credit risk on a repurchase agreement arises when the market 
value of the underlying securities differs from the principal 
amount of the repo. (The borrower is also liable for interest 
but, as suggested by Exhibit 1, this is usually small compared 
with the principal amount of a repo.)
The creditor bears risk when the value of the repo securities 
declines below the repo principal, because the proceeds derived 
from liquidating the securities will not satisfy the creditor’s 
claim if the borrower defaults on its repurchase commitment. 
To protect against the adverse consequences of a decline in the 
market value of repo securities, a creditor might request 
“margin” by, for example, expressing a willingness to lend 
$10 million only against securities worth at least $10.2 million.
Conversely, the borrower bears risk when the value of the 
repo securities rises above the repo principal, because the 
principal will not cover the cost to the borrower of replacing 
the securities if the creditor fails to return them. To protect 
6Meltzer (2003, pp. 629-716) discusses the shift of control of monetary policy 
from the Treasury to the Federal Reserve after the end of World War II. 
Writing shortly before the Accord, Simmons (1951, p. 413) states that probably 
no more than ten large New York banks accounted for most lending to 
government securities dealers. The revival and growth of the repo market 
in the 1950s is noted in Simmons (1954), Roosa (1956, pp. 22 and 47-8), 
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System (1959, pp. 30 and 32-5), Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959, pp. 17, 32, 47, and 49), Meltzer 
and von der Linde (1960, pp. 76-8), U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System 
(1960, pp. 53 and 67-91), Gaines (1962, pp. 213 and 225-6), Willis (1970, 
pp. 21-7), Lucas, Jones, and Thurston (1977, p. 43), and Smith (1978, p. 355).
against the consequences of a rise in the market value of repo 
securities, a borrower might request margin by expressing a 
willingness to borrow $10 million only against securities worth 
no more than $9.8 million.
Margin can protect a creditor (that lends $10 million against 
securities worth at least $10.2 million), or it can protect a 
borrower (that borrows $10 million against securities worth no 
more than $9.8 million), but it cannot protect both parties 
simultaneously. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was customary 
for repo borrowers—primarily nonbank Treasury dealers—to 
give margin to creditors, because the creditors were typically 
more creditworthy than the dealers. In addition, creditors did 
not lend on accrued interest on notes and bonds. (Box 1 
explains accrued interest.) Creditors lending on notes and 
bonds demanded, and received, securities with a quoted value 




When a dealer is asked to bid on Treasury notes that a customer 
wants to sell, the dealer quotes a bid price denominated in percent 
of the principal amount of the notes, with fractions of a percent in 
32nds. For example, the dealer might bid 9915, or 99.468750 per-
cent of principal (99.468750 = 99 + 15/32), for $10 million 
principal amount of the 4 ¼ percent notes maturing on 
August 15, 2014. 
      The invoice price of the notes, that is, the amount paid to the 
customer upon delivery of the notes, is the quoted price plus 
accrued interest to the settlement date of the transaction. Suppose, 
for example, that the dealer is bidding on Monday, May 9, 2005, for 
settlement on May 10. The 4 ¼ percent note last paid a coupon on 
February 15 and will pay its next semiannual coupon (equal to 
2.125 percent of principal) on August 15. There are, therefore, 
181 days in the current coupon period, with 84 days having 
elapsed since the last coupon payment:
      The accrued interest on the August 15 coupon payment, as of 
the May 10 settlement date, is 0.986188 percent of principal 
(0.986188 = (84/181) ×  2.125). The invoice price on the 
customer’s sale is 100.454938 percent of the principal amount of 
the notes (100.454938 = 99.468750 quoted price, plus 0.986188 
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2.2 Property Rights to Repo Securities
The most complicated feature of a repo was the allocation of 
property rights to the underlying securities. Describing a 
repo as “a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to 
repurchase the securities at a later date” suggests that it 
was a pair of conventional transactions, one for current 
settlement and the other for deferred settlement. This was 
not the case. Consistent with the convention noted above, 
that creditors did not lend on accrued interest, a borrower 
was entitled to any coupons paid on repo securities during 
the term of a repo. In addition, the parties to multiday repos 
commonly agreed that a borrower could substitute securi-
ties from time to time during the term of a repo. This “right 
of substitution” allowed a dealer to retrieve a security if it 
identified an opportunity to sell the security at an attractive 
price in an outright transaction.
The right to coupon payments and the right of substitution 
were rights typically enjoyed by dealers when they borrowed 
money on conventional loans secured with pledges of 
securities. The two rights made repos look very much like 
secured loans. However, repo creditors had an important right 
that was not enjoyed by conventional creditors: a repo creditor 
could sell repo securities, or deliver repo securities in settle-
ment of a prior sale, during the term of the repo.8 This reduced 
the cost of lending on a repurchase agreement, because a 
creditor did not have to treat repo securities as the property 
of the borrower and did not have to segregate repo securities 
from its own securities.
3.  The Repo Market in the 1970s
and Early 1980s
The repo market expanded and changed in the 1970s and early 
1980s for three reasons:
￿ short-term interest rates reached successive new heights in 
1969, in 1973-74, and again after October 1979 (Chart 1),
7Joint Economic Committee (1959, p. 1558, testimony of Girard Spencer, 
Partner, Salomon Brothers & Hutzler), Meltzer and von der Linde (1960, 
p. 92), U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System (1960, pp. 68, 76, and 91), 
Willis (1970, p. 22, fn. 2), Lucas, Jones, and Thurston (1977, p. 35), Smith 
(1978, p. 354), Stigum (1978, pp. 312 and 315), Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs (1982, p. 35, testimony of Irwin Sandberg, Vice 
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York), and Lumpkin (1993, p. 63).
8However, the creditor remained obligated to resell comparable securities to 
the borrower at the maturity of the repo, to remit to the borrower any coupon 
payments on the repo securities during the term of the repo, and to return the 
repo securities before the expiration of the repurchase agreement if the 
borrower had, and chose to exercise, a right of substitution.
￿ marketable Treasury debt began to grow at a 
significantly faster pace after 1974 (Chart 2), and
￿ intermediate- and long-term interest rates became 
materially more volatile after October 1979 (Chart 3).
The rising level of short-term interest rates made repurchase 
agreements increasingly attractive to creditors. An executive at 
one industrial corporation stated in early 1979 that “At these 
interest rates, I’d be crazy to leave my money in a . . . 
checking account [that did not earn any interest].” 9 As time 
went on and interest rates rose, an increasing number of 
corporations and state and local governments initiated repo 
lending relationships. They were aided in their efforts by 
brokers that arranged for school districts and other small 
creditors to lend to dealers in regional and national repo 
markets. Some dealers also began to intermediate repo 
credit by running “matched books”—borrowing and then 
relending on repurchase agreements.10
The rapid growth in the volume of marketable Treasury 
debt after 1974 led to a parallel growth in dealer positions 
and dealer financing. The table shows that repo financing 
9“More Firms Use Repurchase Agreements As a Way to Earn Interest on Idle 
Funds,” Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1979, p. 15. The expansion in the repo 
market during the 1970s is described in Lucas, Jones, and Thurston (1977), 
Smith (1978), and Bowsher (1979, 1981). Those authors also cite the impor-
tance of advances in computer technology for stimulating the growth of repos, 
including increasingly sophisticated corporate cash management systems and 
the Federal Reserve’s book-entry and wire transfer systems. Garbade (2004) 
discusses the latter factors.
10Matched-book credit intermediation is noted in Lucas, Jones, and Thurston 
(1977, p. 44), McCurdy (1977-78, p. 46), Smith (1978, p. 357), Stigum 
(1978, pp. 326-32), and Bowsher (1979, pp. 18-9). 
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by nonbank primary dealers began to expand at the same 
time that marketable Treasury debt began to grow more 
rapidly. (A primary dealer is a dealer with a trading 
relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.) By 
the end of 1980, bank and nonbank primary dealers were 
borrowing a total of $55 billion on repurchase agreements. 
A year later, they were borrowing $94 billion.11
The rising volatility of interest rates affected the repo 
market indirectly by elevating the importance of risk 
management. Short sales of Treasury securities, undertaken 
to hedge long positions, became increasingly important. (As 
explained in Box 2, a short sale is a sale of a security that the 
seller has to borrow to make delivery.) Prior to the late 
1970s, short sellers typically borrowed Treasury securities by 
pledging securities with a lender and paying the lender a fee 
of about 50 basis points per annum.12 By the late 1970s, a 
significant number of market participants had adopted a 
simpler way to borrow securities: by lending money and 
“reversing in” securities on special (or specific) collateral 
reverse repurchase agreements.13 (Box 2 explains this 
method of borrowing.) The use of repurchase agreements to 
borrow securities for delivery against short sales relied on the 
established convention that a creditor was free to use repo 
securities to settle an outright sale to a third party.
11Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1981, p. A32, and April 1982, p. A34.
12Meltzer and von der Linde (1960, p. 73), Gaines (1962, p. 210), and Lucas, 
Jones, and Thurston (1977, p. 44).
13Lucas, Jones, and Thurston (1977, p. 44), Smith (1978, p. 357), and Bowsher 
(1981, p. 55). Some market participants borrowed securities on reverse 
repurchase agreements as early as the late 1950s (U.S. Treasury and Federal 
Reserve System 1959, p. 38).
Repurchase agreements evolved in the 1980s because 
existing contracting conventions proved inadequate for the 
market expansion fueled by rising interest rates and growing 
Treasury indebtedness, and because they proved inadequate 
for the growing use of repos to borrow securities. The next 
three sections describe how problems with the existing 
conventions emerged and how those problems were resolved.
4.  Evolution of the Treatment
of Accrued Interest
The basis for the convention by which repo borrowers gave 
margin to creditors—because creditors were generally more 
creditworthy than borrowers—began to erode when dealers 
started lending money to regional banks and institutional 
investors on special collateral reverse repurchase agreements 
Chart 2
Marketable Treasury Debt
Source: Treasury Bulletin (various issues).
Note: The chart depicts marketable debt on June 30 until and
including June 30, 1976, and on September 30 thereafter.
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in order to borrow securities needed to deliver against short 
sales. However, despite the changing balance of credit risks, 
market participants continued to ignore accrued interest on 
repo securities.14
Continued neglect of accrued interest exposed lenders of 
securities on special collateral repos to growing risk as 
interest rates rose. To understand why, consider a bond with 
a 12 percent coupon quoted at 98 percent of principal value. 
Suppose a dealer could “reverse in” $100 million principal 
amount of the bond from a regional bank against lending 
the full quoted value of $98 million. If the bond had just 
paid a coupon, the bond’s accrued interest would be small 
and the bank would be reasonably well protected (lending 
bonds worth a bit more than $98 million against borrowing 
$98 million in cash). However, if the bond was about to pay 
a semiannual coupon, the accrued interest on the bond 
would be nearly 6 percent of principal. In that case, the bank 
would be lending bonds with a total market value of nearly 
$104 million. The exposure of securities lenders to credit 
risk on loans of notes and bonds close to their coupon pay-
ment dates became increasingly significant as coupon rates 
on new issues rose in parallel with the level of interest rates 
(see Chart 3). One market participant acknowledged that the 
continued neglect of accrued interest made “no sense at all.”15
4.1 The Drysdale Failure
On Monday, May 17, 1982, a midsized government securities 
dealer, Drysdale Government Securities, failed. At the time 
of its collapse, Drysdale had a $4 billion short position and 
a $2.5 billion long position in Treasury securities. Although 
details on how Drysdale had depleted its equity capital were 
initially unclear,16 it was quickly evident that firms that had 
lent securities to Drysdale were inadequately margined and 
were going to be left with far less cash than the replacement 
cost of their securities. Drysdale’s failure ultimately led to 
counterparty losses of about $300 million.
Most of the securities borrowed by Drysdale came from 
other dealers through a securities lending desk at Chase 
Manhattan Bank. Initially, on May 17 and 18, Chase officials 
maintained that the bank had been acting as Drysdale’s 
agent and that the losses would have to be borne by the 
dealers. The dealers, however, contended that they had lent 
securities to Chase and that what Chase did with the 
securities was a matter for Chase’s account. The losses were
14Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1982, p. 35, testimony 
of Irwin Sandberg, Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
15Quoted in Stigum (1978, p. 315).
16Welles (1982) provides an extensive post-mortem. See also Stigum (1983, 
pp. 323-7) and Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1983, 
p. 19, testimony of Anthony Solomon, President, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York).
Box 2
Short Sales and Special Collateral Reverse Repos
Suppose that a dealer has a long position in investment-grade 
corporate bonds and expects interest rates to rise. To hedge against 
a decline in the value of the bonds, the dealer may choose to sell 
Treasury notes short. If interest rates go up, the dealer will be able 
to close out its short position at a price below where it sold the 
notes. The premise of the hedge is that gains on the short notes will 
offset losses on the bonds.
      On the settlement date of the short sale, when the dealer has 
to deliver the notes that it sold short, the dealer borrows the 
notes and delivers the borrowed notes:
      The dealer can borrow the notes by entering into a special 
collateral reverse repurchase agreement. A reverse repurchase 
agreement is a repo seen from the perspective of the money 
lender. A repurchase agreement is a special collateral repo if the 
borrower and lender have agreed that only a single designated 
security is acceptable on the repo and that the borrower has no 
right to provide substitute securities. A special collateral 
repurchase agreement differs from a conventional, or “general 
collateral,” repo because in the latter the borrower of funds has 
an option to choose—possibly subject to some limitations—the 
securities that the creditor is to receive and may also have the 
right to substitute securities during the term of the repo.
Suppose that the dealer decides to sell short a ten-year 
Treasury note. Suppose also that the one-week general collateral 
repo rate is 6 percent. The dealer might propose to a holder of 
the ten-year note that the holder sell the note to the dealer 
pursuant to a repurchase agreement at an interest rate of 5 per-
cent per annum for one week. The holder can then earn 100 basis 
points for the week by relending at 6 percent the dealer’s money 
on a general collateral repo.
      When the dealer decides to close out its short position, it 
reacquires the notes in an outright purchase and terminates its 
reverse repurchase agreement by returning the notes.
Dealer
Notes delivered in
settlement of short sale
Buyer
Notes borrowed
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large enough that some dealers were liable to be “impaired” 
if they, rather than Chase, had to bear the losses. A senior 
official at one firm conjectured that “This thing is going to blow 
a hole in somebody.”17
The Drysdale failure was immediately recognized as a 
potentially catastrophic event. Market participants remarked 
that “We’re all in uncharted waters on this one,” and that 
“No one really knows what’s going to happen.”18 The prospect 
of a chain of failures was particularly worrisome: “There are 
hundreds of [repo] transactions out there that look safe until 
one participant goes under.”19
As news of Drysdale’s failure filtered through the market, 
uncertainty about whose capital might be impaired led some 
participants to begin to think about pulling back from further 
trading.20 Faced with an impending crisis, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York reminded market participants that it stood 
ready to act as a “lender of last resort” to assist the commercial 
banks in meeting “unusual credit demands related to market 
problems.”21 The New York Fed also announced that it was 
temporarily suspending limits on loans of Treasury securities 
to primary dealers to facilitate settlements and that, contrary to 
previous policy, it would lend securities to finance dealer short 
positions.22 This led to a ten-fold increase in securities lending 
by the New York Fed. Equally important, on Wednesday, 
May 19, Chase reversed its previous position and announced 
that, pending the outcome of prospective litigation, it would 
assume responsibility for all of the securities loans that its 
collateral desk had arranged.
17“Chase, Dealers Dispute Debts of $160 Million,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 
1982, p. 2. A Chase official commented that “If the problem remained 
unresolved, it could have led very quickly to the ‘impairment’ of several Wall 
Street firms . . . .” “Chase Bank Will Pay Off Interest Owed by Defaulting 
Bond Dealer,” Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1982, p. A1.
18“Bond Prices Seesaw, End Slightly Lower Amid Tensions Over the Drysdale 
Affair,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1982, p. 44.
19“Drysdale’s Default Shows Dangers of Intricate Financing Agreements,” 
Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1982, p. 29. 
20Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1982, p. 26, testimony 
of Anthony Solomon, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, that 
“Uncertainty about clearing and financing arrangements seemed to be 
building. There was concern that investors and traders would pull away from 
the markets because of uncertainty about the magnitude of the problem, and 
that major securities firms would be threatened with losses that could 
jeopardize their ability to function.”). See also Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs (1983, p. 20, testimony of Anthony Solomon that 
“our primary concern at the Federal Reserve was to preserve the orderly 
functioning of the market until the situation could be resolved. We recognized 
some risk that failure to make [coupon payments due on May 15] could cause 
a widespread ‘seizing up’ of the market in which normally major participants 
would be reluctant to undertake new commitments or perhaps even perform 
on their existing commitments.”).
21“A Dealer in Bonds Defaults on Debt,” New York Times, May 19, 1982, p. A1.
4.2 Aftermath
The immediate crisis passed without any additional failures, 
but market participants realized that they had been to the edge 
of a precipice. They further understood that the cause of the 
problem was their neglect of accrued interest on repo securi-
ties. Allan Rogers, president of the Association of Primary 
Dealers in U.S. Government Securities, noted that the neglect 
was “not rational.”23
A week after Drysdale’s failure, the executive committee of 
the dealer association met to discuss contracting conventions 
for repos and recommended that the full membership adopt a 
resolution calling for recognition of accrued interest. Shortly 
thereafter, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced 
that it would begin recognizing accrued interest in its own 
repurchase agreements as soon as it could adapt its computer 
programs. Prompted by the Fed’s new policy as well as by its 
executive committee, the dealer association adopted the 
recommended resolution at a meeting on June 14.24
The Federal Reserve also encouraged other market 
participants to recognize accrued interest on repo securities. 
In late July, the president of the New York Fed announced that 
he had charged Bank officials with working “with the dealer 
community in encouraging [all market participants] to recog-
nize the value of accrued coupon interest . . . .”25 When 
progress appeared to slow in late August, the Fed reiterated 
its view of the importance of changing the contracting 
convention.26 The Fed understood that change would not 
be costless and that change might require “extra efforts . . . 
perhaps involving temporary substitution of manual for 
automated processing.” (Box 3 explains an important 
operational problem created by the recognition of accrued 
interest.) Nevertheless, the Fed stated that it expected the 
change would be implemented by every primary dealer by early 
October—a deadline that was met “with few problems.”27
22“Short-term Interest Rates Plunge as Fed Injects Reserves Due to Drysdale 
Problems,” Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1982, p. 45, “How Agencies Helped 
Avert Drysdale Panic,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1982, p. 29, and Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (1982, pp. 28 and 40-1, testimony of 
Anthony Solomon, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York). This was the 
first time the Fed relaxed the terms of the securities lending program that it had 
put in place in 1969 to help alleviate a growing problem of settlement fails 
(Federal Open Market Committee 1970).
23“Financing Quirk at Drysdale Studied,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1982, 
p. D5.
24“Repurchase Agreements Financing Change Voted,” Journal of Commerce, 
June 16, 1982, p. 6A. The author is grateful to Allan Rogers for his assistance in 
clarifying the chronology of events following Drysdale’s collapse.
25Letter dated July 29, 1982, from Anthony Solomon, President, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, to all primary dealers.
26Letter dated August 27, 1982, from Peter Sternlight, Executive Vice President, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to all primary dealers.34 The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions
4.3 Assessment
When, in the late 1970s, securities dealers began lending money 
to regional banks and institutional investors on special 
collateral reverse repurchase agreements, the economic basis 
for the custom of repo borrowers giving margin to lenders 
began to erode. However, even though nonrecognition of 
accrued interest was an important component of lender 
margins, market participants continued to ignore accrued 
interest. This illustrates the proposition that a contracting 
convention that was efficient for one market environment may 
need to be revised when the environment changes.
27Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (1983, p. 24, testimony 
of Anthony Solomon, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
 Some market participants had concluded, well before 1982, 
that continued neglect of accrued interest made “no sense at 
all.” However, it took the collapse of Drysdale to galvanize 
participants into action. This supports the proposition that 
change in an inefficient contracting provision may sometimes 
come slowly and only in the wake of a precipitative event that 
provides a compelling reason for change.
The decision of the major government securities dealers to 
act collectively through the Association of Primary Dealers, 
rather than individually, is significant. Liquidity in the repo 
market would have suffered if some firms and some creditors 
had decided to recognize accrued interest while others 
continued to ignore it, because a dealer could not fully fund a 
loan to a counterparty that recognized accrued interest with 
a borrowing from another counterparty that ignored accrued 
interest. Absence of a common contracting convention also 
would have led to higher operating costs, because dealers 
would have had to distinguish between creditors that lent only 
on quoted value and those that lent on accrued interest as well 
as quoted value. Consensus preserved the homogeneity of 
repos with different counterparties, thereby preserving 
liquidity and limiting operating costs.
5.  Evolution of the Right to Sell a 
Defaulter’s Securities Promptly
Prior to 1982, most repo market participants believed that a 
creditor could sell the securities underlying a repurchase 
agreement promptly in the event of the borrower’s default. In 
the words of one participant, “If I have your bonds and you do 
not pay me back, it is my prerogative to sell those bonds . . . .”28 
However, the issue was not nearly so clear. If a repurchase 
agreement was construed as a loan secured by a pledge of the 
borrower’s securities, the creditor’s right to liquidate the 
securities might be subject to the “automatic stay” of bank-
ruptcy law. (The automatic stay requires suspension of all 
efforts at collecting pre-petition claims immediately upon the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition.29) The creditor would then be 
subject to the risk of fluctuations in the market value of the 
securities and—if it planned on making a payment with the 
proceeds of the maturing repo—could be subject to a cash flow 
squeeze while it waited for a bankruptcy court to grant it access 
to the securities.
28Quoted in Stigum (1978, p. 332). See also Committee on the Judiciary (1983, 
p. 308, testimony of Thomas Strauss, Chairman, Government and Federal 
Agency Securities Division, Public Securities Association, that “Investors 
believed that they could liquidate their repo transactions in the market and cut 
the risk of loss as soon as they received word of a dealer’s insolvency.”).
29See Epstein, Nickles, and White (1993, ch. 3).
Box 3
An Operational Problem Created by the Recognition 
of Accrued Interest on Repo Securities
Recognition of accrued interest complicated the operational 
aspects of a repurchase agreement on a security that pays a coupon 
during the term of the repo.a To understand why, consider a dealer 
with a long position in $100 million principal amount of Treasury 
notes with a 12 percent coupon. 
      Suppose that the notes are quoted at 98 percent of principal and 
that just before a semiannual coupon is due the dealer finances the 
notes on a $103 million repo. The repo creditor has a margin of 
about $1 million ($1 million = $98 million quoted market value 
of the notes, plus a bit less than $6 million accrued interest, less 
$103 million repo principal). When the coupon is paid, the 
accrued interest vanishes and the total market value of the notes  
drops to $98 million. After the creditor remits the $6 million 
coupon payment to the borrower, the creditor has an exposure, or 
negative margin, of about $5 million. To cure this deficiency and 
restore a $1 million margin, the borrower either has to deliver 
additional securities to the creditor or repay $6 million. Neither 
action would have been required under the contracting 
conventions that prevailed prior to 1982 because, pursuant to 
those conventions, creditors did not lend on accrued interest, so 
passing a coupon payment back to a borrower did not expose a 
creditor to credit risk.
aThe problems associated with coupon payments on repo securities 
were studied during the summer of 1982 by a special committee of the 
Association of Primary Dealers in U.S. Government Securities, headed by 
Miles Slater of Salomon Brothers. They are discussed in “Repo Dealers’ 
Choice?” Barron’s, October 18, 1982, p. 11, and Stigum (1983, pp. 402-4).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2006 35
Although the prospect of significant delay in liquidating 
repo securities was unattractive to creditors, market 
participants had limited incentive to specify clearly that a repo 
was not a loan. Some participants could borrow and lend 
money but were constrained in their ability to purchase and sell 
securities, especially more volatile, longer term securities. 
Leaving open the question of whether a repo might be a secured 
loan allowed them to participate in the repo market. One dealer 
recalled that “We left [the characterization of a repo] purposely 
vague because doing so fit our needs. If a customer said, ‘I can’t 
do repo,’ we said, ‘OK, we will sell you securities and buy them 
back.’ If another customer said he could not buy securities, we 
said, ‘Fine, we will borrow money from you and give you 
collateral.’ It was all very convenient . . . .”30
Prior to 1982, no court had directly addressed the question 
of whether repo securities were subject to the automatic stay.31 
In July of that year, Thomas Russo, a prominent attorney in 
private practice in New York, observed that “The most 
important legal uncertainty concerning repos . . . is whether 
they will ultimately be characterized for purposes of 
[bankruptcy law] . . . as secured loans or as independent 
contracts for the sale and repurchase of securities.” He noted 
that “In light of Drysdale . . . and of rumors of difficulties at . . . 
other firms, market participants . . . are devoting substantial 
attention to devising strategies . . . to reduce or avoid the effects 
of the automatic stay and the uncertainties and delays of 
possibly protracted proceedings.”32
30Quoted in Stigum (1983, p. 398).
31However, following the July 1975 collapse of a small securities firm, Financial 
Corp., several courts had considered the broader question of whether repos 
were loans or transactions. See In re Financial Corp., 1 B.R. 522, 526, fn. 7 
(W.D. Mo. 1979) (although a repo “had many of the attributes of a secured 
loan, there was nothing in the record to indicate that [it was] intended to 
effectuate a security interest”); Gilmore v. State Board of Administration, 382 So. 
2d 861, 863 (Fla. App. 1980) (a repo was intended to be “two transactions, an 
actual purchase and sale of securities with minor characteristics of a secured 
loan, and a simultaneous but separate agreement to repurchase and resell similar 
securities on specific terms”); and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Miller, 
495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a repo “may be viewed as comprising two 
distinguishable transactions, which, although agreed upon simultaneously, are 
performed at different times”). Financial Corp.’s collapse is described in “Firm 
Involved in Government Securities is Placed in Receivership After SEC Suit,” 
Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1975, p. 19, “How an Investment Firm’s Meteoric Rise 
Was Reversed by an Interest-Rate Boost,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1975, p. 26, 
and “Rate Indicators Signal Advance,” New York Times, July 21, 1975, p. 42. See also 
Stigum (1978, pp. 331-2). Recent discussions of whether repos are loans or 
transactions appear in Schroeder (1996, 2002). See also In re Bevill, Bresler & 
Schulman Asset Management Corporation, 67 B.R. 557 (N.J. 1986) and Granite 
Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2nd 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
32American Banker, August 13, 1982, p. 4.
5.1 The Collapse of Lombard-Wall
On August 12, 1982, Lombard-Wall, a small government 
securities dealer with about $2 billion in assets and a similar 
amount of liabilities, filed for bankruptcy. Unlike Drysdale’s 
failure three months earlier, the collapse of Lombard-Wall had 
little direct effect on the Treasury market. Rumors about the 
firm’s financial condition had been circulating for weeks and 
many market participants had already reduced their exposure 
to the failing enterprise.
 The most significant consequence of Lombard-Wall’s 
insolvency came from a court decision. On August 17, the 
bankruptcy court overseeing the insolvency announced that 
the firm’s repos would be treated as secured loans, rather than 
outright transactions, and issued a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting sale of the repo securities.33 Despite submissions by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Goldman, Sachs; 
Salomon Bothers; and the Investment Company Institute (a 
trade association of more than 650 mutual funds) arguing that 
the decision would undermine the liquidity of the repo market, 
the bankruptcy court reiterated its position a month later.34 
The restraining order crystallized the fears of many repo 
creditors that they might not be able to liquidate promptly the 
securities of a defaulting borrower.
5.2 Aftermath
Following the Lombard-Wall ruling, two strategies were 
available to those market participants that favored placing repo 
securities outside the boundaries of the automatic stay: they 
could write contracts that made it clear that a repo was a pair of 
outright transactions, or they could seek an amendment to 
federal bankruptcy law exempting repos from application of 
the stay.
Dealers and institutional investors tried to write contracts 
that clarified the nature of a repo, but the effort got bogged 
down.35 In part, this reflected a reluctance to suppress contract 
33“Lombard Securities With Buy-Back Plan Are Frozen by Court,” Wall Street 
Journal, August 18, 1982, p. 7.
34“Securities in Lombard-Wall Case Termed Loan Collateral by a Bankruptcy 
Judge,” Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1982, p. 10. See also Committee on 
the Judiciary (1983, pp. 333 and 337), Hagerty (1984, pp. 409-10 and 426), 
Walters (1984, p. 830, fn. 9), and Osenton (1987, pp. 680-1).
35In September 1982, the president of one investment management company 
remarked that “Our legal department has been working on [the issue] for more 
than a year.” “Repo Backing is Under Cloud,” New York Times, September 29, 
1982, p. D1. In early 1984, an observer characterized the situation as “legal 
gridlock.” “Repo Market Remains Weak as Legal Issues Trouble Many 
Dealers,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 1984, p. 43.36 The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions
provisions that made a repo look like a secured loan, including 
the borrower’s right to coupon payments and to substitute 
securities, while retaining the aspect of a repo that was present 
in outright transactions: the creditor’s right to sell repo 
securities to a third party.36
In lieu of altering their contracting conventions, private 
market participants and the Federal Reserve petitioned 
Congress for relief. Fed Chairman Paul Volcker urged adoption 
of an amendment exempting repos on Treasury and other 
specified securities from application of the automatic stay.37 
Volcker noted that “repos are a very important tool used in 
Federal Reserve open market operations” and argued that “it is 
important that the repo market be protected from unnecessary 
disruption.” He suggested that if repos were subject to the 
automatic stay, “the rippling effect of the potential loss of 
liquidity or capital on market participants could generally 
disrupt the repo market and cause an otherwise manageable 
and isolated problem to become generalized.” In an effort to 
hasten passage of the proposed amendment, Volcker suggested 
that “it would be preferable to draw the legislation in a rela-
tively narrow manner and to confine its operation to the key 
repo markets in U.S. government and agency securities, 
bankers’ acceptances and certificates of deposit.”38 The 
chairman of the Public Securities Association suggested 
similarly that statutory relief was needed to avoid “severe 
adverse consequences.”39
Efforts to exempt repos from application of the automatic 
stay were unopposed but became entangled with other, 
unrelated issues in bankruptcy law.40 A bill that included a repo 
amendment cleared the Senate in April 1983 but remained 
36See, for example, Dunning (1982). In addition, as one commentator later 
observed, “Mere contractual language or testimony declaring that a transaction 
is not a security interest is not sufficient, standing alone, conclusively to 
establish that a transaction is not a security interest. The standard rule of 
commercial law that substance should control over form is particularly 
important in the bankruptcy context because parties generally wish to avoid 
treatment of their transactions as security interests and, therefore, would 
always be expected to include boiler plate language in their contract reciting 
their intention.” Schroeder (2002, p. 594).
37Letter dated September 29, 1982, from Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Robert Dole, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Courts of the United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, reprinted in Dunning and Lowy (1982, pp. 397-8). Volcker reiterated 
his views in follow-up letters on December 13, 1982, and January 30, 1983 
(Committee on the Judiciary 1983, pp. 305 and 346-8).
38In a follow-up letter on December 13, 1982, Volcker stated that he had 
“stressed the desirability of drawing the legislation in a narrow manner to avoid 
major exceptions to existing bankruptcy law. Thus the Board [of Governors] 
continues to believe that the protection provided by the proposed legislation 
should be limited to those markets which are so large as to raise potential 
systemic problems in situations in which a bankruptcy could affect the liquidity 
and solvency of a large number of other entities . . . .” Committee on the 
Judiciary (1983, p. 347).
stalled in the House of Representatives in early 1984. Finally, in 
mid-1984, after a bankruptcy court froze the repo securities of 
yet another failed dealer,41 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,42 exempting 
from application of the automatic stay repos on Treasury and 
federal agency securities, bank certificates of deposit, and 
bankers’ acceptances.
There is reason to believe that the efforts of the Federal 
Reserve and government securities dealers to secure an 
exemption for repos from application of the automatic stay 
were not misplaced. Chart 4 graphs overnight repo financing 
by primary dealers as a function of marketable Treasury debt 
on a monthly basis from October 1980 (when the Federal 
Reserve began publishing data on primary dealer repos) to 
September 1990. Marketable Treasury debt rose at a fairly 
constant rate over the interval (although the growth rate 
declined a bit after 1986) and it follows from Chart 4 that repo 
financing expanded more or less in line with the growth in 
Treasury debt. However, when we compare actual financing 
with financing predicted from a straight line fitted to the data, 
we see that repo financing stagnated between mid-1982 and 
mid-1983. (Financing volumes in the twelve months between 
June 1982 and May 1983, inclusive, are represented by the 
white circles in the chart.) Financing growth resumed in mid-
1983 (depicted by the squares), but the shortfall from 1982-83 
was not made up until the end of 1985. These results are 
consistent with the proposition that the relative size of the repo 
market shrunk after Drysdale and Lombard-Wall, that it 
stabilized (at a lower level) when it became evident that repos 
would ultimately be exempted from application of the 
automatic stay, but that it did not recover fully until eighteen 
months after passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
39“U.S. Government Securities Dealers Need Self-Review but No New 
Rules, Fed Says,” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1982, p. 6. The Treasury 
Department did not support amending federal bankruptcy law. See letter dated 
March 16, 1983, from Roger Mehle, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
(Domestic Finance), to Robert Dole, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts of 
the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (concluding that “On 
balance . . . parties holding Treasury or other securities in connection with 
[a repurchase agreement] do not merit better treatment under the Bankruptcy 
Code than any other party making a secured loan” and stating that there was 
“absolutely no likelihood of a government securities market breakdown from 
[retaining application of the automatic stay] . . . .”).
40Committee on the Judiciary (1983, p. 304, remark of Senator Robert Dole 
that proposed amendments were “uncontroversial”). 
41“Lion Capital’s Collapse Raises Issue of Unresolved Legal Status of ‘Repos,’” 
Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1984, p. 2. 
42Pub. L. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The provisions that deal with repurchase 
agreements are discussed in Levin and Donovan (1984, pp. 176-83), Schroeder 
(1996, pp. 1028-31), and In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management 
Corporation, 67 B.R. 557, 596 (N.J., 1986).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2006 37
5.3 Assessment
Removing repurchase agreements from application of the 
automatic stay required coordinated action because liquidity 
might have suffered, and operating costs might have increased, 
if some repos remained subject to the stay while other repos on 
the same underlying securities were not. Homogeneous 
treatment could have been obtained with industrywide repo 
contracts that suppressed contract terms that made repos look 
like secured loans. However, because market participants were 
unwilling to sacrifice efficiencies associated with the existing 
allocation of property rights, removing repos from application 
of the automatic stay required Congressional action. The 
legislative channel was more time-consuming but it preserved 
the allocation of property rights that participants found most 
useful.
Efforts to secure a statutory exemption for repos were not 
initiated until a precipitative event—the freezing of the 
Lombard-Wall collateral—provided a compelling incentive for 
change. This illustrates again the proposition that coordinated 
action may be delayed in the absence of a precipitative event.
6.  Evolution of Creditor Possession 
of Repo Securities
Virtually all discussions of repurchase agreements begin by 
describing a repo as a sale of securities coupled with an 
agreement to repurchase the securities at a specified price on a 
later date. Left unstated, but clearly implied, is the presumption 
that the creditor actually takes possession of the securities 
during the term of the repo. However, taking possession of 
repo securities before the mid-1980s was not an inexpensive 
undertaking. A creditor had to arrange for a bank to hold the 
securities in a custodial account, it had to give the bank 
payment and delivery instructions for each transaction, and it 
had to pay a fee for each transaction. The director of finance for 
one municipality characterized bank custodial services as “an 
administrative nightmare.”43
Some small and midsized creditors sought to avoid the 
administrative burdens of conventional repos by accepting a 
representation from a repo borrower that the bank that cleared 
securities for the borrower would hold the creditor’s repo 
securities in a segregated account.44 Repos based on such 
representations were called “letter” repos.
6.1 Creditor Losses on Letter Repos
In early 1984, Lion Capital Group was a small New York 
broker-dealer firm engaged primarily in the business of 
running a matched-repo book, borrowing money from local 
governments and school districts and relending the money to 
others. Lion borrowed on both conventional repos, where it 
delivered out securities to creditors, and letter repos, where it 
represented to creditors that their securities were held in 
safekeeping at its clearing bank. However, Lion’s clearing bank 
was not a party to any safekeeping arrangements for the benefit 
of Lion’s creditors and never confirmed to those creditors that it 
held securities for their benefit. This gave Lion an opportunity to 
misrepresent the status of its letter repo securities.
43“Growing Caution: Big Treasurys Investors Become More Careful After Two 
Firms Fail,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1985, p. 1.
44A clearing bank is a bank that acts as the agent of its customer in receiving and 
delivering money and securities pursuant to the customer’s instructions, and 
safeguarding securities and funds belonging to the customer. A clearing bank 
also provides financing for securities that the customer is unable to finance 
elsewhere. See Committee on Government Operations (1985, pp. 607-18, 
testimony of Charles Viviano, Managing Director, Security Pacific Clearing 
& Services Corp.) and In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management 
Corporation, 67 B.R. 557, 570-571 (N.J., 1986).
Chart 4
Primary Dealer Financing on Overnight Repos
as a Function of Marketable Treasury Debt
Monthly, October 1980 to September 1990
Sources: Treasury Bulletin (various issues); Federal Reserve Bulletin
(various issues).
Note: The white circles represent June 1982-May 1983 financing
volumes; the squares represent June 1983-May 1984 financing
volumes; the line depicts the least-squares fitted relationship
between overnight repo financing and marketable Treasury debt.
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On May 2, 1984, Lion filed for bankruptcy. At the time of 
the filing, Lion had $46.5 million of securities at its clearing 
bank and $85 million in liabilities other than conventional, 
possessory, repos. $33.5 million of securities were held in a 
clearing account and were pledged to secure a $45 million loan 
from the bank. The other $13 million of Lion’s securities 
were held in two “segregated” accounts and were not 
similarly pledged to the bank. Lion owed its letter repo 
creditors $40 million—$27 million more than what was in 
the segregated accounts. The repo creditors ended up 
recovering only 73 percent of their claims.
A year later, two more broker-dealer firms failed and 
imposed another $300 million of losses on letter repo creditors. 
On March 4, 1985, E.S.M. Government Securities collapsed 
with a negative net worth of about $300 million. Letter repo 
creditors accounted for a third of the losses. Five weeks later, 
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman collapsed with a negative net worth 
of about $225 million. Letter repo creditors incurred the bulk 
of the losses. The E.S.M. losses led the president of one large 
dealer firm to comment that “It seems inconceivable to me that 
you get in a position where you don’t have either the money or 
the [securities]. That’s just crazy.”45
6.2 Tri-Party Repo
Creditor losses on letter repos in 1984 and 1985 demonstrated 
the need for a repo mechanism that was both safe and 
operationally inexpensive. Fortuitously, several large clearing 
banks had been working with their dealer customers and repo 
creditors to develop a new form of repo, tri-party repo, to 
reduce dealer financing costs and the costs of delivering repo 
securities. The collapse of Lion; E.S.M.; and Bevill, Bresler 
sharply accelerated interest in the new arrangement.46
In a tri-party repurchase agreement, an “agent bank” stands 
between the dealer and the creditor. A previously negotiated 
contract among the bank, the dealer, and the creditor describes 
the acceptable securities and the margins required on the 
securities. As illustrated in Exhibit 2, at the start of a repo, the 
dealer delivers securities, and the creditor delivers funds, to the 
bank. After verifying that the securities are acceptable and have 
a market value that exceeds the principal amount of the repo by 
more than the required margin, the bank releases the funds to 
the dealer but continues to hold the securities as the creditor’s 
custodial agent. At the end of the repo, the dealer returns the 
45“Thrift Crisis: Closing of Ohio S&Ls After Run on Deposits is One for the 
Books,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1985, p. 1.
46Sollinger (1994). See also Committee on Government Operations (1985, 
p. 616, testimony of Charles Viviano, Managing Director, Security Pacific 
Clearing & Services Corp.).
principal—plus interest at the negotiated rate—to the bank, 
the bank releases the securities back to the dealer, and the bank 
remits the principal and interest to the creditor.
Tri-party repo has two important credit risk characteristics. 
First, it protects the creditor by taking margin from a borrower 
and lodging repo securities with a bank that has explicitly 
agreed to hold the securities for the benefit of the creditor. If 
the borrower fails to honor its repurchase commitment, the 
creditor can instruct the bank to sell the securities and apply the 
proceeds to satisfy its claim for repayment. Second, tri-party 
repo protects the borrower because the bank retains possession 
of the repo securities during the term of the repo, so the 
borrower can recover the securities promptly upon tender of 
the repurchase price. Thus, tri-party repo resolves the conflict 
inherent in conventional repos that borrowers and creditors 
cannot both be insulated from credit risk simultaneously.
In theory, any bank can serve as an agent bank for a tri-party 
repo. However, there is an important operational advantage to 
tri-party repo when the agent bank is the dealer’s clearing bank. 
In that case, the dealer and the creditor can negotiate the 
principal amount, maturity, and interest rate of a borrowing, 
but need not identify the specific securities that will be held by 
the agent bank for the benefit of the creditor. At the end of the 
business day, the bank runs a computer program that allocates 
the securities in the dealer’s clearing account to the custodial 
accounts of individual tri-party creditors. The program 
identifies the allocation that minimizes the quantity of 
unallocated securities, subject to the constraint that no creditor 
receives an allocation that would violate the terms of its tri-
party contract. (The objective of minimizing the quantity of 
unallocated securities is important because the clearing bank 
typically finances any unallocated securities that remain in the 
clearing account at a dealer loan rate in excess of the 
Exhibit 2
Borrowing $10 Million at a 2 Percent Interest Rate 
on a One-Day Tri-Party Repo
Borrower
Starting leg (day 0)
Creditor
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contemporaneous repo rate.) This process eliminates the need 
to transfer securities between banks—as would be necessary if 
the dealer’s clearing bank and the tri-party agent bank were 
different banks—and facilitates least-cost financing of the 
dealer’s securities.47
Tri-party repo was pioneered by Salomon Brothers in the 
late 1970s, primarily as a device to reduce the cost of financing 
its positions in Treasury securities.48 Traders on the firm’s 
funding desk observed that they sometimes received 
deliveries of Treasury securities (from sellers and from 
creditors on the closing legs of maturing repurchase 
agreements) late in the day, when there was not enough time 
to redeliver the securities (to buyers or to creditors on the 
opening legs of new repurchase agreements). The securities 
were consequently left stranded in the firm’s clearing account 
and financed at a dealer loan rate in excess of the contem-
poraneous repo rate. The traders realized that they could 
finance late-arriving securities at lower cost if they could 
arrange custodial accounts at the firm’s clearing bank for 
their repo creditors, so that delivery of securities to those 
creditors could be done internally on the books of the bank. 
Thus, tri-party repo originated as a buffer financing device, 
standing between conventional repo financing and the 
residual, end-of-day financing provided by a clearing bank.
By the mid-1980s, other dealers and other clearing banks 
had replicated the tri-party structure. In the wake of Lion; 
E.S.M.; and Bevill, Bresler, it was not too difficult to appreciate 
that tri-party solved the problem of effecting low-cost pos-
session of repo securities: the dealer’s clearing bank functioned 
in a dual capacity, as a clearing bank for the dealer and as a 
custodian for creditors. One observer estimated that, by the
early 1990s, large government securities dealers financed 
somewhat more than three-quarters of their Treasury 
positions with tri-party repo.49
6.3 Assessment
Tri-party repo was driven, in the first instance, by the motive 
that drives most private sector innovations: profit. Compared 
with conventional repurchase agreements, tri-party repo 
47Committee on Government Operations (1985, p. 257, testimony of 
E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (2002, Appendix 2).
48This synopsis is based on the personal recollections of John Macfarlane, 
who joined Salomon’s funding desk in 1979.
49Sollinger (1994).
provided an operationally cheaper, more flexible way for a 
dealer to borrow money and for a creditor to lend money. 
Unlike the recognition of accrued interest and the exemption 
of repos from application of the automatic stay, the adoption 
of tri-party repo did not require any collective or legislative 
action; it depended only on the individual assessments of 
dealers and creditors of its net benefits. The losses experienced 
by letter repo creditors in the mid-1980s highlighted the risks 
inherent in letter repos and the importance of obtaining 
unambiguous control of a borrower’s securities, and thereby 
hastened the adoption of tri-party repo.
7. Conclusion
In the first two decades after the Treasury-Federal Reserve 
Accord of March 1951, repurchase agreements were used 
primarily by nonbank government securities dealers to finance 
their securities positions with large nonfinancial corporations 
and state and local governments. The repo market expanded 
in the 1970s, when rising interest rates and growing Treasury 
indebtedness attracted many new, smaller, and less sophisti-
cated creditors. The market also changed as rising interest rate 
volatility led dealers to expand their hedging activities and use 
special collateral reverse repurchase agreements to borrow 
securities needed to deliver against short sales. Contracting 
conventions that were not inefficient in the context of the repo 
markets of the 1950s and 1960s—including neglect of accrued 
interest, ambiguity about whether repos were loans or 
transactions, and relatively costly mechanisms for removing 
repo securities from the control of borrowers—proved 
inadequate by the early 1980s.
Changing circumstances, and the appearance of new and 
previously unappreciated risks, produced change in repo 
contracting conventions in the 1980s. Change occurred in a 
variety of ways. The autonomous adoption by individual 
agents of a more efficient contract form—tri-party repo—
was the result of the agents acting in their own economic 
self-interest. In contrast, recognition of accrued interest and 
the exemption of repos (on Treasury and certain other 
securities) from application of the “automatic stay” of 
bankruptcy law were effected, respectively, by collective action 
and Congressional legislation, because uncoordinated, 
individual solutions by market participants would have been 
more costly. References
40 The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions 
Beckhart, B., J. Smith, and W. Brown. 1932. The New York Money 
Market, Vol. IV, External and Internal Relations.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1959. The Federal 
Funds Market. Washington, D.C.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 2002. “Interagency White Paper on 
Structural Change in the Settlement of Government Securities: 
Issues and Options.” Federal Reserve System Docket no. R-1122 
and Securities and Exchange Commission Release no. 34-45879.
Bowsher, N. 1979. “Repurchase Agreements.” Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review 61, no. 9 (September): 17-22.
———. 1981. “Repurchase Agreements.” In T. Cook and
B. Summers, eds., Instruments of the Money Market.
5th ed. Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Committee on Banking and Currency. 1927a. “Stabilization.” 
Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency 
on H.R. 7895, Part 1. U.S. House of Representatives, 69th Cong., 
1st Sess., March 24-25, 30-31, April 1, 6, 8-9, 12-14, 1926.
———. 1927b. “Stabilization.” Hearings before the Committee 
on Banking and Currency on H.R. 7895, Part 2. U.S. House 
of Representatives, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., April 20-22, 27, 30,
May 3-6, June 10, 1926, and February 4, 1927.
———. 1931. “Operation of the National and Federal Reserve 
Banking Systems.” Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency Pursuant to S. Res. 71, 
Appendix, Part 6, Federal Reserve Questionnaires.
U.S. Senate, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess.
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. 1983. “Impact on 
Money and Credit Policy of Federal Debt Management.” Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of 
the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. 
U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., April 25.
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 1982. “Disturbances 
in the U.S. Securities Market.” Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 25.
Committee on Government Operations. 1985. “Failure of Bevill, Bresler 
& Schulman, A New Jersey Government Securities Dealer.” 
Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Government Operations. U.S. House of Representatives, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess., May 15.
Committee on the Judiciary. 1983. “Bankruptcy Reform.” Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Courts of the Committee on 
the Judiciary. U.S. Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., January 24.
Dunning, A. 1982. “Drafting Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase 
Agreements.” In A. Dunning and M. Lowy, cochairmen, 
Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase 
Agreements. Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series no. 290, November 15-16. New York: Practising Law 
Institute.
Dunning, A., and M. Lowy. 1982. Repurchase Agreements and 
Reverse Repurchase Agreements. Commercial Law and 
Practice Course Handbook Series no. 290, November 15-16.
New York: Practising Law Institute.
Epstein, D., S. Nickles, and J. White. 1993. Bankruptcy. St. Paul, 
Minn.: West Publishing Co.
Federal Open Market Committee. 1970. “Record of Policy Actions.” 
Federal Reserve Bulletin 56, no. 1 (January): 31-3.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 1919. Fourth Annual Report 
for the Year Ended December 31, 1918. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office.
———. 1921. Sixth Annual Report for the Year Ended 
December 31, 1920. New York.
Gaines, T. 1962. Techniques of Treasury Debt Management. 
New York: Columbia University Graduate School of Business 
and Free Press of Glencoe.
Garbade, K. D. 2004. “Origins of the Federal Reserve Book-Entry 
System.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy 
Review 10, no. 3 (December): 33-50.
Hagerty, W. 1984. “Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty over the Repo 
Market: Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales 
of Securities.” Vanderbilt Law Review 37, March: 401-31.References (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2006 41
Hardy, C. 1932. Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve System. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Harris, S. 1933. Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Joint Economic Committee. 1959. “Employment, Growth, and Price 
Levels, Part 6B—The Government’s Management of Its Monetary, 
Fiscal, and Debt Operations.” Hearings before the Joint 
Economic Committee. U.S. Congress, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 
August 5-7.
Levin, A., and J. Donovan. 1984. “Repurchase Agreements Under the 
1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.” In A. Dunning, 
chairman, Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase 
Agreements Revisited 1984. Commercial Law and Practice 
Course Handbook Series no. 341, November 29-30. New York: 
Practising Law Institute.
Lucas, C. M., M. T. Jones, and T. B. Thurston. 1977. “Federal Funds and 
Repurchase Agreements.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review 2, no. 2 (summer): 33-48.
Lumpkin, S. 1993. “Repurchase Agreements and Reverse Repurchase 
Agreements.” In T. Cook and R. LaRoche, eds., Instruments of 
the Money Market. 7th ed. Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank 
of Richmond.
McCurdy, C. J. 1977-78. “The Dealer Market for United States 
Government Securities.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Quarterly Review 2, no. 4 (winter): 35-47.
Meltzer, A. 2003. A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume I: 
1913-1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meltzer, A., and G. von der Linde. 1960. A Study of the Dealer 
Market for Federal Government Securities. Materials 
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Osenton, E. 1987. “The Need for a Uniform Classification of 
Repurchase Agreements: Reconciling Investor Protection with 
Economic Reality.” American University Law Review 36, 
spring: 669-91.
Roosa, R. 1956. Federal Reserve Operations in the Money and 
Government Securities Markets. New York: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York.
Schroeder, J. 1996. “Repo Madness: The Characterization of 
Repurchase Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and 
the U.C.C.” Syracuse Law Review 46: 999-1050.
———. 2002. “A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos 
Backwards.” American Bankruptcy Law Journal 76: 565-622.
Simmons, E. 1947. “The Position of the Treasury Bill in the Public 
Debt.” Journal of Political Economy 55, no. 4 (August): 
333-45.
———. 1951. “The Structure of the Postwar Money Market.” 
Southern Economic Journal 17, no. 4 (April): 409-21.
———. 1952. “Federal Reserve Discount-Rate Policy and Member-
Bank Borrowing.” Journal of Business 25, no. 1 (January): 
18-29.
———. 1954. “Sales of Government Securities to Federal Reserve 
Banks Under Repurchase Agreements.” Journal of Finance 9, 
no. 1 (March): 23-40.
Smith, W. 1978. “Repurchase Agreements and Federal Funds.” 
Federal Reserve Bulletin 64, no. 5 (May): 353-60.
Sollinger, A. 1994. “The Triparty Is Just Beginning.” Institutional 
Investor 28, no. 1 (January): 133-5.
Stigum, M. 1978. The Money Market: Myth, Reality, and 
Practice. Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones-Irwin.
———. 1983. The Money Market. Revised ed. Homewood, Ill.: 
Dow Jones-Irwin.
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System. 1959. Treasury-Federal 
Reserve Study of the Government Securities Market, Part I.
———. 1960. Treasury-Federal Reserve Study of the 
Government Securities Market, Part III, Supplementary 
Studies.References (Continued)
42 The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions 
Walters, G. 1984. “Repurchase Agreements and the Bankruptcy Code: 
The Need for Legislative Action.” Fordham Law Review 52, 
April: 828-49.
Welles, C. 1982. “Drysdale: What Really Happened.” Institutional 
Investor, September: 73-83.
Willis, P. 1970. The Federal Funds Market. Boston: Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or implied, as to the 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any information contained in 
documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or manner whatsoever.